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KENcKY LAw JouNAL[o4
RESTRICTIONS UPON THE HOLDING OF REAL PROPERTY IN
KENTUCKY BY RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES AND CORPORATIONS
Statutory restrictions are placed upon the holding of real prop-
erty in Kentucky by religious societies and corporations. It is the pur-
pose of this note to survey the Kentucky cases which have applied
statutes restricting real property holdings. Those cases dealing with
religious societies will be considered first, followed by those dealing
with corporations. The changes which have occurred in the legisla-
tive and judicial attitudes toward restrictions upon the holding of
real property in Kentucky will be evaluated, with emphasis being
placed on the present state of the law.
The present Kentucky mortmain acts are framed in terms of
escheat. Section 273.090(1) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes* pro-
vides that:
No religious society may take or hold legal or equitable title to more
than fifty acres of ground for a longer period than one year under
penalty of escheat.
The Kentucky Constitution, section 192, and KRS 271.145(1) pro-
vide that:
No corporation shall . . . hold any real estate, except such as may
be proper and necessary for carrying on its legitimate business, for
a longer period than five years, under penalty of escheat.
The statutes provide for enforcement of the escheat provisions by
an action in the name of the Commonwealth in the circuit court where
such land is located, after giving notice sufficient to allow the violator
to dispose of the land (one year in the case of religious societies
and two years in the case of corporations').
History and Evolution of Mortmain Acts
The concept of placing restrictions upon the taking and holding
of real property by religious societies and by corporations was in-
herited, along with the common law, from England. The English
have long discouraged conveyances to religious societies and cor-
porations. Such conveyances were known as conveyances into "mort-
main" (deadhand) because they resulted in a "dead" loss to the
feudal overlord.2 Parliament enacted the first mortmain statute, "De
Viris Religiosis," in 1279. It provided that no sale or gift of land could
* (Hereinafter cited as KRS).
lEES 273.090 (2); KRS 271.145 (2).
2 James, Introduction to English Law 376 (3d ed. 1955).
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be made to a religious house without the king's license. The prohibi-
tion was subsequently extended to all corporate bodies.3
A recent study4 notes certain extensions and modifications of the
traditional mortmain statutes. The trend has been toward extending
the scope of mortmain statutes beyond a mere safeguard against the
inalienability of real property. Not only is the power of religious so-
cieties to hold real property limited in some states, but the right to
hold personal property is limited as wellY "Time before death" and
"percentage of estate" limitations are imposed in several states.6 In
the former, testamentary dispositions to religious societies must be
executed within a stated period prior to death, while in the latter,
bequests or devises to religious societies may not exceed a certain
percentage of the net estate. The author of the study points out that
these extensions by state legislatures emphasize a policy of protec-
tion of heirs who might suffer as a result of a last minute bequest
or devise to a religious society.7
While the original purpose of legislation restricting corporations'
real property holdings was identical to that of the statutes aimed at
religious societies, changes of purpose have occurred in the area of
restrictions upon corporate property as well. For example, the state
may require that corporate assets be kept liquid (especially in the
case of financing institutions and banks), or that land be held locally
rather than by foreign corporations over which the state has little
supervision.8
Restrictions upon the Holding of Real Property by Religious Societies
Litigation in Kentucky involving restrictions upon the right of
churches and religious societies to hold real property has been rather
limited. There have been only a dozen cases in the past century. Prac-
tically all of these cases involved a statute passed in 1893 which pro-
vided:
No church or society of Christians shall be capable of taking or
holding the title, legal or equitable, to exceeding fifty acres of ground;
but may acquire and hold that quantity for the purpose of erecting
thereon houses of public worship, public instruction, parsonage or
graveyard. 9
3 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law 87 (1923).
4 Joslin, "'Mortmain' in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Study"
29 Can. B. Rev. 621 (1951).
V Id. at 624, 625. The author lists the states which have personal property
restrictions and gives code citations.
6 Id. at 626, 629. The author points out, however, that the "time before
death" statutes have been subject to easy circumvention by last minute inter
vivos transfers.
7 Id. at 629.
83 American Law of Property § 12.76 (Casner ed. 1952).
9 Ky. Acts 1893, ch. 200 § 3.
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This statute differs materially from the one on the books today,10
in that it was worded as a bar to the capacity of a church or "society
of Christians" to take title to real property in excess of fifty acres.
The 1893 statute contained no escheat provision as does the present
statute.
The 1893 statute referred only to "societies of Christians." The
court construed this to include religious societies in general and not,
therefore, discriminatory against Christians." The present statute
adopted this construction literally.
Since the 1893 statute was not framed in terms of escheat, but
as a bar to the capacity of churches or religious societies to acquire
title to real property, the Kentucky court held that the real parties in
interest who could attack a devise to a religious society through the
statute were the heirs at law who would take the property by in-
heritance if the devise were void.'2 A literal interpretation of KRS
278.090 would seem to dictate that the state is the only interested
party and that an original proceeding in the name of the Common-
wealth is the only type of suit in which the statute may be invoked
today. Such an interpretation would uphold the policy of preserving
the alienability of real property while eliminating the policy noted
earlier, i.e., the protection of close relatives from disinheritance by
devises to religious societies.
13
All the reported Kentucky cases in which mortmain statutes have
been invoked have involved testamentary dispositions to churches or
religious societies. Where the testator has attempted to vest title to
more than fifty acres of real estate in a church or religious society,
the Kentucky court has held that the devise failed 14 and the interest
passed to the heirs at law as in intestacy.15 Furthermore, where real
property has been conveyed to a church under a will in violation
of the statute, and the church has subsequently sold the property, the
unremembered heirs have been able to proceed against the church's
vendee and recover the property. 16 In such a case, the vendee has
been freed from his obligation to pay the purchase price and has been
10 The term "mortmain act" is used in a broad sense in this paper, and
includes any restriction upon the holding of real property by religious societies
or corporations, regardless of how enforced.
11 Compton v. Moore, 156 Ky. 544, 550, 161 S.W. 540, 543 (1913).
12 Id. at 549, 161 S.W. at 542.
13 Joslin, supra note 7. The author points out that mortmain acts have, for
policy reasons, been used for the protection of heirs from disinheritance by
devises to religious societies.
14 Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W. 2d 984 (1946). The
court supported a holding that an ultimate devise in fee to religious society was
void as a perpetuity by stating that it was also violative of the mortnain statute.
15 Compton v. Moore, 156 Ky. 544, 161 S.W. 540 (1913).
16 Spradlin v. Wiman, 272 Ky. 724, 114 S.W. 2d 1111 (1938).
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granted recission of the purchase agreement.'7 Where a church sold
property which had been devised to it, without dedicating any part
of it to church purposes, the court could find no basis, under the 1893
statute,18 for allowing it to retain even the fifty acre minimum. 9
On the other hand, it has been held that if the devise of real estate
fails by reason of the statute, the church may take up to fifty acres
subject to the restrictions upon its use imposed by the statute, even
though the testatrix attempted to bestow a greater number of acres
on the church.20 The only logical distinction between the two cases
seems to be that in the former the church, by its sale of the property,
demonstrated unequivocably that none of the property devised would
be used for church purposes.
Since there is no statutory restriction in Kentucky upon a bequest
of personal property to churches or religious societies, such a bequest
has been upheld even though the personalty consisted of the pro-
ceeds of a sale of real property directed by the testator.
21
Even though the testator did not specifically direct a sale, one
case held that his direction that the property was to be used to
establish a "fund" idicated his intention that it be sold. Relying upon
equitable conversion the court treated that as done which should have
been done and directed a sale of the property for the benefit of the
church.22 In one case the testator directed that real property be placed
in trust for designated churches. At the termination of the trust, the
property was to be sold and the proceeds divided among the churches.
The sale of the property for the benefit of the churches was upheld,
but the court held that since the trust was invalid under the mort-
main statute, the testator died intestate as to the duration of the trust.23
A strict application of the 1893 Kentucky mortmain statute would
seem to prohibit a church or religious society from holding real prop-
erty as trustee of a charitable trust. As Professor Scott24 points out,
however, the effect of mortmain statutes on charitable trusts depends
upon judicial construction of these statutes. The Kentucky court seems
to have adopted a liberal construction of the mortmain statutes where
charitable trusts are involved. Where real property has been devised
to churches or religious societies to be used for a charitable purpose
17Wiman v. First Christian Church, 273 Ky. 821 117 S.W. 2d 989 (1988).
The court pointed out that the church should have been joined in the original
proceeding against its vendee.
Is Ky. Acts 1893, ch. 200 § 3.
19 Spradlin v. Wiman, 272 Ky. 724, 114 S.W. 2d 1111 (1938).
20 Compton v. Moore, 167 Ky. 657, 181 S.W. 360 (1916).
21 Chambers v. Higgins' Ex'r, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1425, 49 S.W. 486 (1899).
2 2 Willett v. Willett, 197 Ky. 663, 247 S.W. 739 (1923).
23 Street v. Cave Hill Inv. Co., 191 Ky. 422, 230 S.W. 536 (1921).
244 Scott, Trusts § 362.4 at 2605 (2d. ed. 1956).
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which is sufficiently indefinite to take it out of the private trust
category, the court has upheld the devise. The court has consistently
interpreted the statute toward this end, stating that the statute was
aimed at the churches' taking title to real property for their "own
use'25 or that "no title vests in any one church, nor is the trust for
the benefit of any one church."26 The fact that a religious society
held the legal title to real property under such trusts has never been
held violative of the statute.
The Kentucky court's liberal treatment of devises to churches or
religious societies for charitable purposes indicates a departure from
the policy of the original mortmain acts. Where the devise purported
to vest title absolute in a church or religious society, the court con-
strued the statute as prohibiting the taking or holding of real property
in excess of the prescribed acreage. On the other hand when the
devise purported to vest title in a church or religious society as
trustee for a charitable purpose (as distinguished from ordinary
church activities), the statute was interpreted so as to permit the
taking of title when the holding of it would not violate the purpose
of the statute. In other words, the taking of title which would other-
wise be voidable by reason of the lack of capacity of the devisee is
tolerated because of the policy favoring charitable dispositions of
property.
It should be kept in mind that all of the available Kentucky case
law on this subject deals with a statute which is substantially dif-
ferent from the one on the books today. KRS 273.090 is an escheat
statute. It is not worded as an absolute bar to the capacity of a
church or religious society to take title to real property. It does, how-
ever, place a time limitation of one year upon the holding of title to
more than fifty acres. Prior to its repeal in 194627 the 1893 statute
did not sanction the taking or holding of title to more than fifty acres
for any purpose, for any period of time. The fundamental differences
between the two types of statutes are aptly explained in an early
Kentucky opinion applying the old statute:
Escheat statutes are designed to take from corporations the title to
lands theretofore lawfully held but which have been held for a
longer period than allowed by law and in violation of law; the
Mortmain Statutes are designed to prevent acquisition of land by
corporations in violation of law. Escheat Statutes from their very
25 Kinney v. Kinney's Ex'r, 86 Ky. 610, 6 S.W. 593 (1888). The object
of the trust was foreign missions.26 Shrader v. Erickson's Ex'r, 284 Ky. 449, 145 S.W. 2d 63 (1940). The
object was education of young priests. Kentucky Christian Missionary Soc'y v.
Moren, 267 Ky. 358, 102 S.W. 2d 335 (1937). The objects were Christian
Churches of Laurel and adjoining counties.
27 Ky. Acts 1946, ch. 150.
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nature must provide for forfeitures; in Mortmain Statutes which
are intended to prevent acquisition of lands there is no necessity
for a forfeiture provision. The State under an Escheat Statute is the
party in interest, and, of course, it alone can go into court and de-
mand a forfeiture; but in this case where we are dealing with Mort-
main Statutes which positively prohibit the church from taking the
title to this property, but which provides for no forfeiture to the
State, the real parties in interest are the heirs at law of the testa-
trix, who will take it by inheritance if the devise is void.28
It would take a strained judicial interpretation to apply the present
statute for the benefit of unremembered heirs.
Since Kentucky has no statutory limitation upon testamentary
dispositions of either real or personal property to religious societies,
the law as it stands today seems to offer no relief to heirs who have
been disinherited by devises to such societies. The purpose of pre-
venting the holding of large parcels of land by churches or relig-
ious societies for their ordinary church purposes (as distinguished
from the holding for a charitable purpose) is maintained by the pres-
ent escheat statute. While the trend in most states has been to in-
crease the protection of near relatives from disinheritance,2 9 Ken-
tucky has removed her mortmain statute from this area. The present
escheat statute operates to prevent the holding of real property in
"dead hands" in accordance with the purpose of the original mort-
main acts. This strict legislative attitude is likewise contrary to a
decided trend in the United States to remove the restriction.3"
Restrictions upon the Holding of Real Property by Corporations
The Kentucky constitutional provision and statute restricting the
ownership of real property by corporations are framed in terms of
escheat. Statutes proscribing holding more real estate than is neces-
sary for the purpose of the corporation are rather innocuous on their
faces and lend themselves to the exercise of broad judicial discretion
in their application.
The Kentucky court has interpreted the restriction as not being
absolute. That is, land not necessary and proper for the legitimate
business of a corporation may be held for a period longer than five
years if such land was purchased and subsequently held with the
good faith intention to use it in the future as a "needful" part of the
business.
31
2s Compton v. Moore, 156 Ky. 544, 549, 161 S.W. 540, 542 (1913).
20 Joslin, supra note 4, at 630.
0) Ibid.
31 Commonwealth v. Mengel Box Co., 152 Ky. 287, 153 S.W. 771 (1913).
A city lot was held for the purpose of assuring the corporation access between its
principal places of business. German Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 606,
133 S.W. 793 (1911). An insurance company had purchased a lot adjoining
its office building with a view to expanding its offices.
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The judicial attitude is illustrated by the following passage from
a Kentucky case:
It was certainly not the intention of the delegates, in framing the
constitutional provision relied upon, nor of the members of the
legislature, in enacting the statute cited to carry out this provision,
that corporations should be dealt with in a narrow or niggardly
manner; or that they should be deprived of the right to look into
the future and provide for a safe, expeditious and economic conduct
of their business; but, on the other hand, their purpose was to
prevent railroads or other corporations from buying up large and
valuable tracts of land, not for any use connected with their busi-
ness, but for speculative purposes, or for the purpose of removing
the minerals or timber on such lands from the market, for the time
being at least. It was abuses of this character that the makers of the
constitution and the legislature were aiming to prevent. Although
a corporation takes title to property and holds it for a longer period
than five years, such property is not subject to escheat, unless the
corporation is unable to show that it is needed for future use in the
proper, fair, and legitimate conduct of its business. Cases will neces-
sarily arise, where it cannot be definitely determined whether the
property will or will not be necessary for the corporate use; but, if
it appears, with reasonable certainty, that it will be, and in the
happening of a contingency like that here sought to be provided
against would be, needed by such corporation in its business, the
court would not hesitate to declare the holding to be for a future
use, and hence, justified, and, in no wise, violative of the consti-
tutional provision relied upon.
32
In keeping with this liberal attitude, the court has held that the
five year limitation does not run during a period when the corpora-
tion holds the property for a proper intended future use, and its
application to such use has been prevented by litigation involving
the property.3 3
The consideration of future uses would seem to be a reasonable
concession by the courts and not contrary to the historic purpose
of the statute, i.e., the prevention of real property being held in "dead
hands."
34
Where the Commonwealth has succeeded in sustaining its burden
of proof,3 and no bona fide intention to devote real property held
by a corporation to a legitimate future use can be established, the
court has upheld rulings that the property escheat to the Common-
wealth. The purpose of the statute has been carried out where the
corporate violator had acquired the property to protect itself from
loss on liens which it held on the property, 36 and where the illegally
32 Commonwealth v. Mengel Box Co., supra note 81 at 291, 153 S.W. at 772.
33 Commonwealth v. Kentucky Traction Co., 140 Ky. 387, 131 S.W. 16
(1910).34 Great-West Life Assur. Co. v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 288
S.W. 2d 639, 641 (Ky. 1956).
35 Louisville School Bd. v. King, 127 Ky. 824, 107 S.W. 247 (1908).
36 German Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 606, 133 S.W. 793 (1911).
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held property consisted of a storehouse connected to a building used
as the corporate home.
37
The restriction has not been held applicable to all corporations;
it applies to private corporations and not to public institutions such
as schools.38 It does not apply to a corporation organized for the pur-
pose of, and engaged in the business of, buying, selling, owning,
holding and dealing in real estate.39 It does not apply to a corpora-
tion which has ceased doing business except to wind up its affairs,
when part of the necessary five year allowance period is included in
a period in which the corporation was defunct.4 ° The constitutional
provision has been held not to be a bar to action by the legislature
in authorizing insurance companies to invest part of their reserve
funds in real estate in Kentucky for a longer period than five years.
41
The Kentucky court has made it clear that any real property held
by a corporation, whether subject to escheat or not, is transferable
by the corporation until escheat proceedings have actually been
instituted. A transfer of title to property, even though illegally held
by a corporation for longer than five years, vests an indefeasible
title in its vendee, and the illegal holding is not grounds for rescis-
sion of a subsequent contract for purchase of the property.
42
While the basic statutory restriction based on section 192 of the
Kentucky Constitution has remained unchanged throughout the his-
tory of the restriction, the present provision for giving notice prior
to the institution of escheat proceedings would seemingly alleviate
the harshness of some of the earlier decisions noted.
KRS 271.145(2) provides in part:
... Before any such action may be instituted, the Attorney General
or the Department of Revenue shall give written notice to the
corporation that, unless the property is disposed of within two years
after receipt of the notice, an action will be commenced to forfeit
the real estate .... The serving of the notice shall not invalidate or
impair the corporation's title to the real estate, nor abridge its right
to convey it before the action, nor affect the title of the person to
whom conveyed.
This provision, added to the statute in 1946,43 would remove the
risk of complete loss by a corporation of real property which it holds
37 Commonwealth v. Clark County Nat'l Bank, 187 Ky. 151, 219 S.W. 175
(1919).
38 Kerr v. City of Louisville, 271 Ky. 385, 111 S.W. 2d 1046 (1937).
39 Cree v. Associates Co., 192 Ky. 669, 234 S.W. 288 (1921).
40 Louisville Banking Co. v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 690, 134 S.W. 1142
(1911).
41 Great-West Life Assur. Co. v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 288
S.W. 2d 639 (Ky. 1956).
42 Louisville School Bd. v. King, 127 Ky. 824, 107 S.W. 247 (1908).
43 Ky. Acts 1946, ch. 141.
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in violation of the statute if the illegally held property were market-
able at any time during the two years following the giving of notice.
Conceivably, however, private corporations which are holding real
property not necessary and proper for carrying on their legitimate
business and not for a legitimate future use could be running a grave
risk. The notice provision has not as yet been tested in the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. An early case held that, for purposes of determin-
ing when a cause of action accrues, the constitutional provision was
self-executing.44 Should the court hold that an enforceable cause of
action accrues under section 192 of the constitution, notwithstanding
the provision for giving notice to violators which is contained in the
statute, any feeling of security engendered by the language of KRS
271.145(2) could be swept away.
Conclusion
The policy of restricting the holding of real property by religious
societies and corporations is a very old one, based on the English
statutes of mortmain. It has undergone various extensions and modi-
fications in American legislation in keeping with shifts in policy con-
siderations.
While the trend in the United States has been to abolish such
restrictions, Kentucky retains them, limiting churches and religious
societies to holdings of fifty acres of land. The present statute is en-
forceable by escheat proceedings and is not framed in terms of a
bar to the capacity of churches and religious societies taking title
to real property. It appears, therefore, that the statute would not bar
a gift or devise of real property to a religious society, provided that
the property is disposed of within the time allowed by the statute.
Heirs who have been disinherited by a devise to a religious society
do not appear to have a remedy under the present statute, as they
did under earlier Kentucky legislation. Prior to its amendment in
1946, the Kentucky statute went to the capacity of churches and
religious societies to take and hold real property in excess of fifty
acres. This statute had a double policy function: it preserved the
alienability of real property, and it protected the immediate heirs
of landowners from disinheritance by devises of more than fifty
acres to religious societies. Under the present escheat statute, going
only to the holding of real property by religious societies, the Com-
monwealth is the real party in interest in any proceeding to escheat,
and presumably would be the only party capable of invoking the
statute.
44 Louisville Banking Co. v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 690, 693, 134 S.W.
1142, 1144 (1911).
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The present statute adequately carries out the historical purpose
of mortmain acts. It operates to preserve the alienability of real prop-
erty, while presumably allowing religious societies to benefit from
an intended devise of real property if disposed of within a reason-
able time. Mortmain statutes are not designed for the protection of
heirs. If such protection is desired, it should be provided by inde-
pendent legislation drafted specifically to deal with the problem.
Apparently the Kentucky constitutional provision and correspond-
ing statute46 dealing with restrictions upon the ownership of real
property by corporations have come under recent re~valuation. One
of the twelve subjects to be considered by a proposed constitutional
revision convention (which failed to carry in a referendum) was:
"Removal of limitations on the holding of real estate."46 This recent
interest would seem to indicate a need for an evaluation of the re-
striction in Kentucky.
Kentucky restricts the holding of real property not proper and
necessary to the carrying on of the legitimate business of private cor-
porations to a five year period. The restriction is enforceable by escheat
proceedings in the name of the Commonwealth. The Kentucky court
has consistently refused to apply the restriction where property which
would otherwise be subject to escheat is held for a legitimate future
use by the corporation. It is only where the Commonwealth can
sustain its burden of proving that the property is held by the cor-
poration for no legitimate future corporate use that the court will
order an escheat. The court has tended to be rather liberal in determin-
ing what is a "proper and necessary" use; if the use will be a "need-
ful" one the property will not be subject to escheat.
The restriction has been held not applicable to corporations whose
business consists of dealing in real estate. Also, the constitutional
provision does not operate as a bar to legislation allowing the hold-
ing of real estate by a particular type of corporation.
The constitutional provision upon which the statutory restriction
is based contains no provision for the giving of notice prior to the
institution of escheat proceedings, as does the statutory provision
passed in 1946. If the Kentucky court were to hold that the consti-
tutional provision is self-executing, corporations holding real prop-
erty in violation of the constitution would be in grave danger of
losing the property through escheat.
Assuming the validity of the statute, the purpose of preserving
the alienability of property, though slightly diluted by the five year
45 Ky. Const. § 192; KRS 271.145.
46 Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 4 at 6.
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period of allowance, is preserved. Since the legislature has manifested
a disposition to do away with the constitutional provision it would
seem reasonable to expect some legislative action in the near future.
The restriction serves a purpose which is as vital today as it was
when the original mortmain acts were promulgated. Perhaps, how-
ever, it would be a reasonable concession to exempt urban real estate
from the restriction. Corporate bodies could be permitted to hold
urban real estate not necessary for their primary business activities,
while the privilege of holding agricultural land could be reasonably
restricted by the present five year tenure provision. Such a statutory
approach would recognize the need for corporate capital in urban
development, while retaining the primary objective of keeping agri-
cultural land alienable.
Allen Prewitt, Jr.
